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Hue. George W. Smith offers a very good
perspective on what such street fighting
is all about.
Joseph Anderson
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Secret War against Ha-
noi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs,
and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York:
HarperCollins, 1999. 408pp. $27.50
At its core, this is a remarkably well told
story of failure—heartbreaking failure to
be sure, and failure despite the heroic
efforts of some remarkable men to
achieve success, but still failure. The U.S.
covert war against Hanoi was, as this
book makes clear, patently unsuccessful.
That it could have been otherwise makes
the story all the more compelling.
A leading expert on low-intensity conflict
and covert warfare, Shultz has filled a gap
that has troubled those who for decades
have been trying to understand the Viet-
nam War. Using meticulously documented
research, and writing in a reader-friendly
style, Shultz lays out the history of the
U.S. Military Assistance Command Viet-
nam Studies and Observations Group
(usually referred to simply as “SOG”)
from 1964 to 1972. Such a book is argu-
ably long overdue, but classification of
material and the lack of documented in-
terviews with former SOG members crip-
pled previous attempts. At worst, the
operations of SOG have suffered gross
distortions, turning one of the war’s most
interesting features into farce and pulp
fiction. Happily, this is no longer the
case. Now, using newly declassified docu-
ments, Shultz lays to rest many of the
myths—including the now-infamous
CNN claim that Operation TAILWIND in-
volved killing U.S. deserters and the use
of the nerve agent Sarin.
Shultz begins his tale by explaining how
an aggressive Kennedy administration,
angered and humiliated by the Bay of
Pigs, formally placed CIA-controlled co-
vert operations against North Vietnam
under military leadership. President Ken-
nedy, his brother Robert, and other key
advisors wanted immediate results, and
they ignored the fact that a covert opera-
tion takes time to achieve its desired ef-
fect. Nor was the military high command
ecstatic about gaining this new responsi-
bility. A generic aversion to special oper-
ations, fear of where Kennedy might be
taking the Army, and distrust of many
involved in Special Operations, resulted
in a bureaucratic struggle of rare inten-
sity and duration. One of the tragic iro-
nies emerging from Shultz’s research is
that from the beginning, senior U.S. mili-
tary and political leaders effectively pre-
vented SOG, which was charged with the
new covert mission, from achieving its
full potential.
Thus, the cards were stacked against SOG
from the start. One obstacle was an ad-
ministration that, following President
Kennedy’s assassination, seemed hesitant
to take advantage of apparent opportuni-
ties. Nor did SOG ever receive proper
support from the military or CIA leader-
ship. Opposition from senior members of
the State Department was at times fero-
cious. In addition, SOG’s South Viet-
namese counterpart was never fully
trusted, possibly with good reason. As a
result SOG rarely had the right mandate
or qualified people, operated under
byzantine restrictions, and never
achieved a rapport with the one organi-
zation that could have dramatically in-
creased its effectiveness. Shultz also
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points out that from time to time SOG
created its own problems. There was con-
cern over discipline and, more problem-
atic, security vulnerabilities of which the
group seemed unaware.
Nonetheless, SOG managed to carve out
a role for itself, eventually running four
major types of operations against the
forces of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam: cross-border commando oper-
ations in Laos and Cambodia, aimed at
observing and interdicting the Ho Chi
Minh Trail; insertion of South Vietnam-
ese agents into North Vietnam to carry
out resistance operations and deception;
maritime interdiction and commando
operations against the North Vietnamese
coastline; and psychological warfare op-
erations aimed at North Vietnam. While
some of these, such as the insertion of
agents into the North, were carried out
only by Vietnamese personnel, others,
such as actions against the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, also involved Americans. Shultz ex-
tensively covers these operations, and the
reader cannot help but be impressed by
the courage of those who carried them
out. However, because these efforts were
never integrated into the overall strategic
plan (if ever such a plan truly existed), the
results were less effective than they might
have been. Yet despite it all, SOG came
close enough to offer a tantalizing vision
of what could have been done. This is
one of the most depressing and intrigu-
ing aspects of the entire book.
If Washington and Saigon did not take
SOG’s efforts seriously enough, the same
cannot be said of Hanoi. The North was
extremely sensitive to SOG’s actions and
worked hard to counter them. In this the
North Vietnamese were remarkably suc-
cessful. If the United States did not get
covert operations right, the North Viet-
namese certainly got counter-covert
operations right. The book explores the
Vietnamese actions in some detail, much
of it for the first time. This facet of the
book makes fascinating reading.
For students of U.S. national security de-
cision making, this book is a superb case
study. Shultz not only discusses the oper-
ations of USMACVSOG but examines
and describes how these issues were han-
dled in the Pentagon and the White
House. Furthermore, he does not limit
his examination to the actions of cabinet
members, military commanders, or key
presidential advisors but sheds light on
organizational structures, procedures,
and lower-ranking action officers. This
aspect of the process is all too often
overlooked.
There are many familiar names to be
found here. These include such Special
Forces legends as Dick Meadows, who was
to be responsible for advance ground re-
connaissance during the failed Iranian
hostage rescue attempt; and Colonel “Bull”
Simmons, who led the brilliantly executed
but unproductive prisoner-rescue raid
against the Son Tay prison. Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara and General
William C. Westmoreland both have
their say, as do the general’s Navy and
Marine Corps counterparts. Some read-
ers might feel that presenting these dispa-
rate viewpoints is enough, but given the
failure of SOG to live up to its potential
and its losses in lives and treasure, rea-
soned judgments of responsibility and
accountability should be made. Shultz
does not shirk from this task, and his
conclusions are convincing.
Richard Shultz wraps up with a masterful
summation and analysis of the longest
U.S. covert campaign in wartime. He
also provides a brief overview of the
status of the Special Operations com-
munity today. In doing so he poses
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interesting questions for covert opera-
tions of the future.
If this were all The Secret War against
Hanoi accomplished, it would be a signif-
icant contribution to our understanding of
the Vietnam conflict, thereby earning a
place on our bookshelves. But Shultz has
also performed a long overdue and badly
needed service in recognizing the tre-
mendous human cost associated with
SOG’s operations. The casualty figures
are simply staggering. For example, of
approximately five hundred agents placed
in North Vietnam, apparently all were
killed or captured; some were “doubled.”
Only slightly less appalling are the casu-
alty rates suffered by the U.S.-led recon-
naissance teams that operated against the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. The worst year was
1969, in which counter-trail operations
in Laos experienced a 50 percent casualty
rate. It is only fitting that the danger
these soldiers faced and the sacrifices
they made be part of the public record
of the Vietnam War.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Bradley, James, with Ron Powers. Flags of Our
Fathers. New York: Bantam, 2000. 353pp. $24.95
On the northern perimeter of the
Arlington National Cemetery, clearly vis-
ible from the adjacent highway, stands a
huge bronze monument embodying per-
haps the world’s most famous war
photograph: the flag-raising on Mount
Suribachi during the seizure of Iwo Jima
in February 1945. Flags of Our Fathers,
told by the son of one of the men repre-
sented by the figures, is an intensely per-
sonal history surrounding this event, a
riveting story guaranteed to evoke emo-
tion in any reader interested in what
Tom Brokaw has called “the greatest
generation.”
Although Bradley is neither a strategist
nor a military historian, he understands
the significance of Iwo Jima and places it
properly in the context of World War II.
This is not revisionist historiography.
Bradley solidly affirms Truman’s deci-
sion to drop the atomic bomb to save
American—and Japanese—lives, because
the alternative would have been even
more horrific. The author’s depiction of
the training regimen, camaraderie, and
exploits of the U.S. Marine Corps will
make all Marines proud. However, he is
not so kind to other services, often por-
traying them as weak willed, unprofes-
sional, even incompetent.
James Bradley is the son of John “Doc”
Bradley, a Navy corpsman who joined
five Marine brothers-in-arms during the
Herculean struggle to wrest “Sulfur Is-
land” from the Japanese. In the course of
the battle, these six members of “Easy”
Company were memorialized for raising
the American flag, an image captured by
Joe Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize–winning
photograph. Three of the six never re-
turned home—a testimony to the overall
casualty rate of 84 percent for E Com-
pany in the thirty-six day conquest of an
island a third the size of Manhattan.
The complete story of the flag raising was
never told, because the principals consid-
ered the photograph insignificant when
compared to the sacrifice of those who
did not return. Like many of their fellow
veterans, the three survivors adamantly
refused to discuss the details of their war
experiences, even keeping secret their
awards for heroism under fire. Following
his father’s death in 1994, Bradley inter-
viewed the friends and loved ones of all
the men to tell the “real story” behind the
photograph.
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